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Report· to the CounciR on the duration 
of the  ·tJransitnonai peJriod related to the introduction of the 
Euro 
1.-ollc)wing  a  proposal  by  the.  Belgian-Finance  Minister,  the  .Ecolin  Council  or-
I X  January 1999 discussed the possibility of reducing the transitional period with a view 
tl)  brir1gingforward from  lsfJanuary2002 the date for  introd~cing euro notes and coins~ .. 
. . 
The Council considered  "!hat  the  trailsilion period could most  like~v not  he  shortened 
he cause· of  lechnica/ reasons".  However, it  invited the Commission to carry out  ·a~ lin'; it 
review ofthis qu!;!stion.  -
This report ha:s been drawn-~p in  response to that request.  It  is  the l)utcomc of a munlK'r 
of co'ntacts· which -have taken place either within official groups meeting P.criodically  to. 
discuss aspects of the introduction of  the euro or in the context of exchanges ofviews or 
letters  with representatives of the  sectors  concerned.  The Commission  has~ therefore. 
endea~oured to highlight the technical:issues ·which w()uld act as a barrier to reduCing the 
transitional. period, as requested· in the Council's mandate.  This report is not, therefore, 
exhaustive, but  it emphasises. the potential stumbling blocks to a politicnl decision. 
However.  the  entire, process  leading  up· to  the  completion ·or. the  liim\. stage  or  the  • 
introduction of'the euro, i.e.  the circulation of coins and  notes. ohviously  assum~s gr'cat 
political  significance since ·it  provides  .. European  citizens  in  the  p~1rticipating l:ountrics 
with .the most tangible.,sign of their currency: euro notes and·coins.  · It is.  therefore. in 
one cif these two areas -technical constraints and the adoption of  tl1c curo hy _the  ~itizens ·,, 
- that. the  Co~mission considers a reduction  in  the  thre~~year thmsitional  p~riod ~.:ould· . 
give rise to te<;hi1ical  problems of such severity as to jeopardise the smooth transition tl,  .. 
the euro; 
~· 
•  I . I.  The·technical obstacles to reducing the transitional period 
constitute  a  series  of .factors  which  militate. heavily  in 
favour of  adhe~ing to a period of three years 
This part covers four technical areas ·in which the  greatest difficulties would arise if the  .  · 
trapsitional period were reduced. ' 
1.  The time required to produce euro c·oins and notes represents a 
'substantial technical obstacle to a significant reduction in the length 
of  the transitional period  · 
.  .  . 
The President of the European Central  Bank (ECB)_  had an opportunity to  ddin~: thcs~ · 
technical obstacles in  ryis  address to the European Parliament on  19 January 19.99.  Till' 
existing  timet~ble provides for  production of the  13 billion  notes  required  to  begin  in 
February-March 1999 and be completed in September 2001.  Production could. according · 
to  the ECB, be speeded up by  a few months, but not more,  ~d  that would substantially 
increase the manufa:~turing costs.  It  ~ould be technically impossible to reduce the period· 
by an entire·year, which would leave only two years for the production process. 
The problem is -even ·more  acute in the case of coins,  produ_ction  of which· is  the 
responsibility of the Member States.  The manufacturing pro.cesses  and  logistics are in· . 
fact  more complicated tor coins than forhotcs.  The~Working Par~y of Member States' 
Mint  Directors  discussed  this  poi!lt  on  23 February 1999  and  concluded  that,  f(lr 
technical reasons, it was not possible to reduce the period scheduled for producing curo 
coins.  Only three countries suggested thai a limited reduction, of no  more than .lwo or 
three  month~. might be possible.  It should be  noted  that  the  time required. to  prodlll.:e 
coins had strongly influenced the choice of a three-year transitional period,  which was 
adopted·by the Madrid European Council of 15 and ·16 December 1995. 
The European Vending Association has made it dear that it  is  strongly oppost.!d  w any 
change in  the date for  introducing coins and  notes.  It considers the  three-year period 
to  he  necessary  for  adapting  the  several  million  coin-operated  machines  existing  in 
Europe,  while  traders  in  this  sector are already  exercising strong  pressure to ensure 
that the changes are made with!ri the time allowed. 
2 ' 
'  I 
i 
I 
0 
j• 
d 
I. 
2. lnforrmaiion systems would constitute a bottlenec'k 
.  .  . 
Ofall the technical  ~spects which may be ~ited as ob~tacles to reducing th~ transitional. 
period, information technology takes precedence.  · This is tr_ue,  first,  from the point of 
view of the periods required  for  the  design and adaptation of information  systems: 
Software houses indicatethat, in any medium-sized or large organisation, the adaptation 
of computing tools will take tWo ye_ars,  (e: si~ months for planning, t~elve months for 
implementation and six months for  testing .. These periods cannot,  on the· whole,  be· 
reduced.·  ·  · 
Second, the· extent of the data-processing changes to be carried out is impressive.  The . 
experience :of the changeover of the markets and large financial institutions, but also the 
examples of undertakings which decided to switch their accounting systems to the curo in 
1999, reveal that neariy 80% of an organisation's .so[twarc has to he adapted to cn·ahlc it 
·  to"r~ad ct1ro".  It does not yet seem-possibk to  propose a type of software that  is. totally 
compatible with the-curo and ready to use without specifically examining the functioning 
ofthc organisation or undertaking concerned.  · 
Lastly,  the· millennium bug provides ·a  reason· not  to  channel information· tedmology 
resources towards prepar.ing for the euro.  On the one hand,· it is ,CUITl'll~ly ·.olwinus  thitt 
much energy and many IT resources are being 'concentrated on the year 2000.  On the 
other, shortening· the transitim1al· period· would  result  in  an  even  more critical  overlap 
. between. the. timeframe for cooping  with the ·millennium  problem and  that  for  adapt  in~ 
software to the  euro.  In  view of the uncertainty still sulTOUJKiing: economic .operators' 
state of preparation. for the year 2000, common _sense  dictates, that the present timetable 
should be mai~tained  . 
. AGcordingly: the timescale for designing and .introducing.information sytems:the l'Xh:nt· 
of  the ,changes  to· be  made  and  the  millennium  issue  are  alrc<idy  causing  SOlllt.'  IT 
operators to beco.me alarmed about the· possibility of a bottleneck in the availability of 
resources in·the year ~002. Recourse to exten1at resources migl_1t not  suJiic~ to  guarantel~ 
sound preparation for 2002 accordfng to some experts.  Even if. these claims prow to  he 
imfounded, there is no doubt that a reduction in the transitional period would result 
in a  trade-off between the millennium  and the euro. 
[·· 
3.  .  The changeover to the euro by tire public administrations was ·  .  , 
sche~uled·for  the year 2002from the outset in-order-to take account·.,  .  ··· ..  -o 
· :· ...  ·  ·.:  · :of  the complexity and extent of  th.e changes required in this sector > · 
The Madrid  scenario had  n1ade  provision  n.~r the  public administratioi1s  to  switch over 
·.·  ctllllplctcly-·to the curtl only at  the end of the transitional period, in  view of  thl~ extent of' 
·the ai.I.Justmen,ts-to he im1de  in this sector.·  'l'hc,administralions' plans were thus drawn.up  ._.,_ .··  ,~·:  ,. 
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in accordance with these deadlines, although all the participating Member States decided 
to offer firms  in· particular the. option of using  the  euro  from ·1  Janu~ry 1999  in  their 
.relations with the administration. 
The  adjustments  carried  out  by  1 January  -1999  were,  therefore~  limited  in  extent: 
installation  of "conversion"  software  to  enable  incoming  and  outgoing  flows  to  be 
processed in  the national currency unit or the euro, adaptation of certain financial  and 
accounting  procedures, adaptation of legislation  and  training  of specialist  staff in  the 
financial administrations. 
The bulk of the preparatory work in  the public administrations has still, however, 
to  be  carried out.  The administrations are responsible for some very extensive areas, 
which will be affected by-the changeover to  the euro.  They must, therefore, adapt their 
information systems and software, often by having recourse to the limited own resources 
of their_ internal  IT  departments.  The· complexities in,volved  in  adapting  information 
systems are heightened by the. very large volume or historical and statistical data that an: 
processed  by  the. administrations.  In addition  to  the  legal  arrangements  estahlish~:d in 
order  to.  maintain  the  value  of the  euro  against  the' old  national  _currcm:y  units.  th~o: 
administrations have also, on the whole, chosen to adapt their legisl_ation and references 
to. monetary amounts in such a way as to ensure that citizens' understand them clearly. 
This substantial task is complicated by the problems of thresholds and prices which an.: 
round  sum's  in  national currepcies, but are not when converted to  euro.  Thousands of 
documents  must;· therefore,  be  scrutinised  by  the  national  and  local  authorities.  The 
administrations,wi-11  also have a considerable effort  to  make in  terms of staff training,. 
p<1rticularly  in  the  case  or officials  who  have  contact  with  the  public.  Th~: trainin!,t 
programmes, which involve several million people. arc spread t)vcr a inunher of years  . 
Finally, the administrations must ensure that &II  public services, including the smallest llf 
the  at~thorities and local  government bodies,  have completed their preparations with'n 
the time al~owed.  There is great concern about the absence of measures on the part of the 
local authorities, particularly the smallest, aimed at introducing the euro. 
The extent of thes.e  problems_  led  the  majority of  national officials_  responsible for 
preparing the administrations for  the introduction of the euro to  reco,mmend  that 
the three-year period be maintained during the consultation which  th~ Commission 
organised in this connection (meeting of the national coordinators responsible for their 
. administrations'  preparations  for  switching  to·  the  euro,  held  on  5  March .J 999  m 
Brussels) ..  · · 
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4.  The  legal implications of a.  "failure to fulfil expectations" must not be 
underestimated  - · 
· The Madrid scenario resulting from  a  European Council decision and. the  Regulations 
e~tablishing the  legal  framework  for  the  euro~  particularly  Council  Regulation  (EC) 
No 1103/97 of 17 Julie 1997 on  'certain provisions relating to the -introduction of the euro 
and ~ouncil Regulation (E.C) No 974/98 of  3 May i 998 on the introduction of the· euro, 
created substantive law situations.  The European Commission and Council might expose 
themselves to claims for damages for failure to fulfil legitimate expectations, e.g. on the 
part of  firms which had placed orders with tneir IT service suppliers for the year 2001.  It 
is obviously impossible to assess these legal risks precisely.  . 
A  sector~by.;sector analysis thus reveals the real technical difficulties stemming from a 
redlicti9n.  An  analysis based on the operators concerned  confirms  that  a  'threc.:y~:ar 
period is probably adequate. 
II.  The preparation of certain economic operators requires 
·intensification 
The definition 'of a stage-by-stage scenario culminating ir1  the  changco~cr lo the curn nf  a 
critical· mass of activities on  1 January  1999  <~nd in  the subsequent exploitation of th\s 
success  in  ord~r to  heighten awareness of the curo among other operators.  especially 
small  arid  medium-sized  firms, , traders  and  the  public  at· large,  has  already- hccn 
sanctioned by the success ofthe financial markets' transition to the euro.  This tcchnicnl  · 
success  ~ust'not cause one to lose sight of the fact that this phase was preceded by n 
very long preparatory phase, which also spanned three years (December 1995  to 
.  .  ~ 
December 199~).  ·  .  . .  ·  .  ·-
Within even the sectors which have made the transition, the situation is  n<:it  always 
homogeneous.  A  significant  number  of large. European  firms  should  switch  their-
accounts to the euro in 1999, but not all will do so, rnainly because they prct~rred to can-y 
out  lirst the  changes  required  by  the  millennium  bug.  In  the  bankirig  sect01'.  the 
changeover of  millions ofpersonal accounts could constitute an obstacle to reducing the 
tra~sitional period.  ·  · 
.  . 
The preparation  of SM Es, traders and the general puhiic will also menn  fulfilling  · 
some  technical  requirements,  which  mny  he  on  a  lower  level.  hu_t  will  he  mon· 
·numerous  • 
Where small and medium-sized entcrpri'ses and traders arc Cl)nccrncd, there  i~ lirsl ·or ull  ~ 
a  problem of numbers:  the Community of Fillecn comprises no  ti;wcr than -18  million 
SMEs or one-person  businesses  (includir1g  trade~s).  For  these_ cconoi11ic  operators, · 
~preparation for the euro resembles that .required by  large  firms,  insofar as all Tunctjons 
;and activ:ities of a firm arc affected.  Computing, accounting br pricing adjustmcr1ts will 
have  to  be  carried  out  with  far  fewer  n.:sources,  and  ollcn 
5 by one p~rson acting .alone.  To grant these operators a preparation period equivalent to 
that allowed the finanCial sector would appear to be the wisest solution.  While it is still 
difficult  to  gather  indicators  regarding  the  state  of preparation  of  the~e  · econo~ic 
operators, all the evidence suggests that it is far from complete. 
In the case of the ge~eral public, technical data are less crucial.  The importance of  the. 
work already carried out in the  commuri.i~ation sector should, however, be noted.  The 
transition to the euro is based on a communication policy which has already succeeded in 
part of its task.  The message that has been targeted for a number of years 'at the general . 
public,  sma11  and  medium-sized  firms ·and  traders  consists  in  telling  them  that  the 
transitional  peri<?d  is  designed  to·  allow  the  gradual  adoption  of the· euro  and  the 
establishment of a changeover plan that is suited to  the particular circumstances of the 
firm  or of each individual.·  Communication is  thus one. of the  great successes of the 
transition to the euro: it has involved a information campaign on a very vast scale which 
has  mage  it  possible  to  offer  increasingly  more  complex  mc.ssagcs.  Changing,  th~.· 
transitional  period  now  would  probably  jeopardise  the  results  of these  deccntmlised 
communication policies and would be costly; 
From the consumer's point of view, the transitional  period  has aln:ad)'  produc~.·d ·~mt· 
succt:ss,  namely  double  display:  a  number  or  administrations  in  the  particjpatinJ;. 
Mt:mber States, large firms and a significant number of traders have adopted the practkc 
. of displaying prices. in both the euro and the national currency unit.  From this point of 
view, the transitional period  provides an opportunity to learn' about the new curo prices 
and  scales  of value.  A  reducti9n  in  this  period  would  be  contrary  to  the  objective 
established when the Madrid scenario was adopted.  ··  -
lo addition to  these technical obstacles, shortening the transitional period would 
undermine one of  the strong points in the success of the _euro, namely the confidence · 
of economic; and social.operators, which has been won as a result of adhering to n 
strict timetable.  A number of officials and managers consulted by  the Commission 
have pointed out that the success of the euro·to. date has lain chiefly in the fad thnt 
the  deadlines  set  have  been  respected,  despit~  the  economic  sittintion  of  the 
participating co.untries  • 
. Ill. The advantages of reduci~g the transitional. period cannot be 
guaranteed  ·  ·  ·  -
1.  The political argument for bringing forward the date loses its force if. 
time involved is insignificant 
·The proposal  for bringing  I~H'W<trd the  date  f(.)r  introducing curo  coins and  notes  was 
made in a specific context: in  view of the popular success of the euro in  the early days or 
1999. it seemed desirable that the citizens should h;tve  ~ccess as quickly as possible to a 
tangible European means of payment..  .  ' 
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However, the technical constraints described above sho.w that, even by an optimistic 
reckoning, the transitional period could not be reduced by more than a few months  . 
. The main political advantage of  this proposaB thus loses some of its force: if the date · 
for introducing c9ins and-notes were not brought forward to a sufficient extent, the 
move :Would be o·f less interestto the citizen .. 
. 2.  · .  A discussion on reducing the transitional period would reopen the 
debate on the optimum date for introducing coins and notes 
it was in  November 1997  that the Commission held- consultations on the choice of the 
best possible date for introducing euro coins and  notes.  The discussions  had  revealed 
deep divergences between the.different interest groups. but also between Member ~tatcs, 
some of which .proposed  dates other  than -I  Jan-uary 2002.  This .dnte  was  eventually 
chosen because of its strong symbolic character.  If the techniCal constraints do not allow _ 
a significant reduction in th~·transitional period of~t least a full year. a reductim1 of  a few 
· months would unquestionablyopen up·a debate that would be. difficult to settle. since no 
.·  arguinent would lead to a definitive decision. 
Conclusion 
In  view of the  technical  arguments  set  out  in  Part  I,  the ·timl'  n:quin..-d  by  cconomh: 
operators  and  the  psychological  and  political  uncertainties  mentioned  in  Part II,  the·· 
Commission . c_onsiders. that  the transitional  period  for  the  euro .  should  not  be 
reduced.  Adhering.to three years will constitute an essential element ofstability ill  th\: 
-process. of preparing economic operators and familiarising them with th\: euro. 
However~- this  proposal has had the advantage of highlighting  the  efforts which 
must be made in order to ensure that the transitional period is a period of gradual 
familiarisation with the euro, particuhirly for the citizen.  Development of the use of·· 
the euro in the form of sc,:riptural  money- during the transitional period is essenthll to  th~ 
success of the introduction of the single currency and the smooth transition to the euro. 
· On 31  December 200t', citizens should be ready to use the euro, a long transitional period 
is only meaningful-if it is used for a progressi~e changeover by economic agents. 
J."ull  usc must also. be made ofthe transitionaL period to promote th\: sound pn:pnratini1 of 
economic  t)pcrators,  thereby  avoiding  a  rush  in  the  linal  ye~1r.  In  this  conn~ctini1  . 
emphasis must be 'placed on. makilig economic operators realise the extent or the work to 
he carried out. As regards the  sectors concerned,  th~ Commission consitkrs it  necessary 
to  heighten  the  awareness  of small  and  medium-sized  !inns,  consumers  and  public 
administrati"ons, particularly lrieal at1thorities.  "'  · 
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